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Abstract 
 
Certain aspects of a demonstration have been shown to influence infants’ interpretation of an 
observational situation and result in selective imitation. Studying social factors that trigger 
selective imitation may improve our understanding of how infants encode certain situations. 
However, only a few studies have investigated the possible interactions among these factors. 
In our study, 18-month-old infants (N = 54) observed an adult demonstrator retrieve a toy 
from under an opaque (‘‘baited”) container by manipulating another transparent empty one. 
Infants were assigned to one of four conditions representing all combinations of two social 
factors: ostensive communication during demonstration (Communicative vs. Non-
communicative) and presence of the demonstrator during reenactment (D-present vs. D-not 
present). Results suggest that infants’ choice behavior was formed in two steps: during the 
demonstration and during the test phase. Furthermore, an interaction between the effects of 
the two levels was observed. Communication during the demonstration triggered imitative 
learning. Infants tended to copy the observed manipulation to learn the communicatively 
assigned way to reach the goal. This choice behavior was not influenced later by the presence 
or absence of the demonstrator. The non-communicative demonstration, however, did not 
elicit a particular learning mechanism. 
 
Introduction 
 
Studying the context-dependent emergence of imitation (or selective imitation [Hilbrink, 
Sakkalou, Ellis-Davies, Fowler, & Gattis, 2013; Király, Csibra, & Gergely, 2013]) in human 
infants can help us to understand and differentiate possible encoding and choice-making 
processes behind imitation (Keupp, Behne, Zachow, Kasbohm, & Rakoczy, 2015; Over & 
Carpenter, 2012). The effect of single factors on infant imitation has been studied extensively 
over the past few years. The following have been shown to have a facilitatory effect on 
infants’ imitative behavior: belonging to the same social group (Buttelmann, Zmyj, Daum, & 
Carpenter, 2013), familiarization with the demonstrator (Learmonth, Lamberth, & Rovee-
Collier, 2005; Shimpi, Akhtar, & Moore, 2013), and transient features of the social context 
such as relational affiliation or friendly behavior of the demonstrator as opposed to an ‘‘aloof” 
person (Nielsen, 2006). 
It has also been shown that ostensive communicative cues, such as eye contact and verbal 
attention getting that signal the demonstrator’s communicative intent, may also play a major 
role in promoting imitative behavior (Király et al., 2013). This finding is in line with the 
findings obtained in earlier experiments (Brugger, Lariviere, Mumme, & Bushnell, 2007; 
Nielsen, 2006), where infants were more likely to imitate actions after having seen the 
demonstration in a communicative context than in a non-communicative context. Moreover, 
evidence suggests that in the presence of communicative cues infants tend to interpret an 
action demonstration as a generally accepted way to perform the observed behavior and, 
therefore, tend to imitate even unusual and inefficient actions (Brugger et al., 2007). 
Accordingly, Csibra and Gergely (2009) proposed that communicative demonstrations trigger 
generalized or normative learning, where the observer considers the entire demonstration to 
be customary (‘‘the way we do this”) and reenacts the observed demonstration in a non-
selective manner. This account, however, does not take into consideration the presence or 
absence of the demonstrator during reenactment. 
Only few studies have investigated the possible effects of the presence of the demonstrator 
during reenactment. Király (2009) found that 1 week after the observation of a successful tool 
use, a higher percentage of 14-month-old infants imitated the observed action when the 
demonstrator was present during the reenactment than when she was absent. This suggests 
that the demonstrator could act as a reminder cue and/or a knowledgeable communicative 
partner to trigger imitative behavior. In a study by Nielsen and Blank (2011), 4- and 5-year-
old children observed two female experimenters performing the same means-action; one of 
them performed only the necessary steps to reach the goal, whereas the other one integrated 
some irrelevant steps. Children copied the irrelevant steps only when the demonstrator who 
performed them was present during the test. These results indicate that children, when 
imitating a previously observed action, are specifically sensitive to the presence of the 
particular person from whom the knowledge was obtained. The authors interpreted this 
demonstrator-selective imitation as children’s motivation to promote their shared experience 
and to build rapport with the demonstrator. 
Importantly, the two aforementioned factors affect different stages of the learning process: the 
communicative cues during demonstration and the presence of the demonstrator during 
reenactment. Therefore, it stands to reason that these factors affect children’s tendency to 
imitate interacting with each other (Király et al., 2013). However, it is a largely unexplored 
aspect of infants’ imitative behavior, with only a few studies systematically focusing on the 
interaction between these factors (Hoehl, Zettersten, Schleihauf, Grätz, & Pauen, 2014; Király 
et al., 2013). In fact, communicative demonstration was used in all studies where the effect of 
the presence of the demonstrator during reenactment was investigated (Király, 2009; Király et 
al., 2013; Nielsen & Blank, 2011). Furthermore, in studies where the effects of 
communication were examined, there was some communicative interaction included, at least 
during some phases of the non-communicative context of the experiment (Brugger et al., 
2007; Hoehl et al., 2014; Király et al., 2013; Shimpi et al., 2013). 
Here, we investigated how combinations of these factors—(a) the ostensive- communicative 
manifestation of the demonstrator during demonstration and (b) the presence of the 
demonstrator during reenactment—affect the imitative behavior of infants. We created a tool-
use task in which participants could see how an object is retrieved from under an opaque 
(‘‘baited”) container by the manipulation of a distant and obviously empty (transparent) one. 
Importantly, the situation was conflicting given that infants could either imitate the observed 
less efficient action (by following the demonstrator’s solution to manipulate the empty 
container) or emulate the goal by performing a more efficient but self-developed solution 
(manipulating the baited container).  
Based on findings of previous studies, we expected that infants would show a significantly 
stronger tendency to imitate the demonstrator’s less efficient action in those trials where the 
demonstrator used ostensive communicative demonstration regardless of her presence. 
Contrarily, in the Noncommunicative/D-not present condition, we expected infants to be more 
likely to explore alternative (goal-oriented) actions through emulation. In non-communicative 
contexts, even when a demonstrator was present during reenactment, lower imitation level 
was found compared with communicative contexts (e.g., Brugger et al., 2007). However, 
other data indicate that children tend to imitate extensively when they try to build or maintain 
a bond with the demonstrator (Nielsen, 2006; Over & Carpenter, 2009). Because we excluded 
all forms of communication from our non-communicative context, we assumed that imitation 
might appear in the presence of the demonstrator so as to establish a social connection with 
her. Thus, we expected an interacting effect of the two social factors on infants’ imitative 
behavior. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
A total of 54 infants (27 girls and 27 boys, Mage = 18.12 months, SD = 0.25, range = 17.5–
18.9) were included in the final analysis (see Table S1 in online supplementary material). 
Participants were selected from a database of volunteering families. Thirteen infants were 
tested but excluded from the analyses due to parental interference (n = 7) or experimenter 
error (n = 6). ‘‘Non-responsive” infants, who did not make a choice within 90 s, were also 
excluded (n = 10). Infants were assigned randomly to one of four experimental conditions. 
 
Experimental arrangement  
 
Participants were tested at the baby lab (5 _ 5 m) of the Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience 
and Psychology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. A transparent plastic container and an 
opaque plastic container of equal shape and size (12 cm high and 16 cm in diameter) were 
placed 0.6 m apart on the floor. Both were turned with their openings down and placed on a 
black platform (15 _ 15 _ 6 cm). The white opaque container was used to hide the target 
object (a tennis ball). The platform was slightly aslope so that the ball rolled out when the 
baited container was elevated. The two containers were connected by a string, which was led 
through two pulleys fixed to the ceiling. A curtain covered the pulleys, and this was also used 
to prevent the infants from witnessing the rebaiting of the container. By moving the empty 
container horizontally, the baited container lifted up (see Figs. S1 and S2 in supplementary 
material). Infants were videotaped by two cameras (one facing the infant and one facing the 
experimental apparatus). 
 
Procedure 
 
Familiarization phase (10–15 min) 
Right after entering, the mother sat down while the infant was allowed to explore the room 
and play with toys. A female experimenter (helper) talked to and played with the infant. The 
demonstrator (the first author) was also present and occasionally smiled at the baby and talked 
to the mother; however, she neither talked to nor played with the infant. Following the 
familiarization, the toys were put away. A curtain covered the experimental apparatus 
throughout this phase. 
 
Demonstration phase 
 
The parent was asked to sit down on a chair facing the containers (at a distance of 3 m) and 
hold the infant on her lap. The demonstrator placed the ball under the opaque container, while 
the curtain prevented the infant from witnessing the baiting procedure. Infants witnessed the 
demonstrations in one of the following conditions. 
Communicative demonstration. The demonstrator, who was standing between the two 
containers, pulled back the curtains and looked at the infant. She addressed the infant by name 
and said, ‘‘Look! I am going to show you something interesting! We are going to play with a 
tennis ball!” After that, she touched the two containers simultaneously. Then, the 
demonstrator addressed the infant again (‘‘Look at this!”). As the demonstrator made eye 
contact with the infant, she grasped the empty container by both hands and placed it on the 
ground ahead of the platform. At that point, the baited container elevated and the tennis ball 
rolled out toward the infant. Then, the demonstrator turned her head toward the ball, shifting 
her gaze conspicuously from the infant to the ball. Finally, she picked up the ball and bounced 
it twice to the ground but did not give it to the infant. She closed the curtain and re-baited the 
opaque container. 
Non-communicative demonstration. This procedure was identical to that described above 
except that the demonstrator turned her back to the infant and performed the actions without 
ostensive communicative signals. She did not look at the infant, nor did she address or instruct 
the infant. During the entire procedure, the demonstrator mumbled a short meaningless poem 
to non-communicatively attract the infant’s attention to the demonstration. In each condition, 
the action demonstration was repeated a total of three times. The side of the baited container 
was counterbalanced between participants. 
 
Test phase 
 
Immediately after the third demonstration, the demonstrator closed the curtain and placed the 
ball under the opaque container. Then, she pulled back the curtains again and either left the 
room (D-not present condition) or remained there (D-present condition). 
D-present condition. After communicative demonstration, the demonstrator stood motionless 
at a predetermined  
place (on the left side, about halfway between the participant and the apparatus) and 
encouraged the participant by looking at him or her and saying, ‘‘Now it’s your turn!”. After 
noncommunicative 
demonstration, however, the demonstrator sat on a chair (where she stood in the 
communicative demonstration) with her back half-turned to the apparatus while reading a 
newspaper. 
In this case, she neither looked at nor talked to the infant. 
D-not present condition. In this situation, the demonstrator left the room without talking to the 
infant. After communicative demonstration, she looked and smiled at the infant once before 
leaving the room. Following the demonstration, the mother released her infant, who was then 
encouraged to explore the apparatus (‘‘Now it’s your turn! You can try it!”). Importantly, the 
parent was not allowed to make comments, give verbal instructions, or point toward the 
apparatus. The infant had 90 s to approach and manipulate the apparatus. 
 
Coding and data analyses 
 
Infants’ ‘‘first choice” was recorded. A container was regarded as chosen if infants touched it 
with their hand, manipulated it, or at least unambiguously pointed at it. The manipulation was 
further analyzed (see Tables S2 and S3 in supplementary material). Based on the container 
choice (empty or baited) and the manipulation they performed, infants were categorized into 
one of three response categories. In the ‘‘emulative response” (0) category, the infants 
approached and manipulated the baited container. In the ‘‘pseudo-imitative response” (1) 
category, the infants approached and manipulated the empty container, but the infants’ 
behavior did not contain any elements of the demonstrator’s manipulation. We created this 
variable to differentiate between two behavioral forms that potentially reflect differences in 
the understanding of the original demonstration. Manipulating the target location without any 
elements of the original means–actions could be a result of local enhancement (Want & 
Harris, 2002) or another low-level social learning mechanism. In the ‘‘imitative response” (2) 
category, the infants approached and manipulated the empty container and copied some 
elements of the way the demonstrator had performed the action (for more details, see Tables 
S2 and S3). 
For those infants who performed imitative or pseudo-imitative responses, we also recorded 
whether they showed any interest in the potential effect of their manipulation. This ‘‘causality 
checking” behavior (cf. Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998) was introduced to show that 
infants encoded that the means they reenact is indeed the way to arrive at the observed 
outcome. This additional variable allowed us to confirm differentiation of potential 
underlying learning formats; it suggests insightful social learning when causality checking 
occurs after manipulating the empty container, whereas its absence indicates a lower level 
learning. Causality checking was defined as showing one or more of the following three 
actions: (a) orientation to the baited container while manipulating the empty one, (b) 
switching to the baited container immediately after manipulating the empty one, and (c) 
getting the ball immediately after manipulating the empty container (Table S2). 
To assess inter-observer agreement, a second person blind to the demonstration scored the 
data. Cohen’s j values were .90 (for manipulation categories) and .91 (for causality checking), 
showing a high level of reliability. 
Statistical analyses were conducted with R 3.1.1 (R Development Core Team, 2014). Choice 
behavior was analyzed with non-parametric ordinal logistic regression model. This model 
presumes a nonparametric response variable on an ordinal scale. Our response variable had 
three levels (0, 1, and 2) where the following values referred to closer similarity to the 
demonstrated act. Our data fit all preassumptions of the model. The effects of ‘‘demonstration 
type” and ‘‘presence of D” as main factors and their interaction were tested in the model. Post 
hoc tests were carried out by Mann–Whitney U tests. Due to multiple comparisons levels of 
significance (p values), we used false discovery adjustment for correction of the data after 
Benjamini and Hochberg (1995). Causality checking (present vs. non-present) was analyzed 
by binomial tests (test proportion = .50). 
 
Results 
 
Ordinal logistic regression analysis on the two main factors (demonstration type and presence 
of D) revealed significant effects of both factors on infants’ choice behavior (demonstration 
type: coefficient value = 4.02, p = .0001, adjusted a = .014; presence of D: coefficient value = 
2.49, p = .007, adjusted a = .036). The interaction of the two main factors was significant 
(interaction coefficient value = _3.41, p = .007, adjusted a = .029). Post hoc analyses revealed 
no significant differences when comparing the Communicative/D-present and 
Communicative/D-not present conditions, U(1) = 108.5, p = .30, adjusted a = .043. There was 
no difference between the Communicative/D-present and Non-communicative/D-present 
conditions either, U(1) = 76.0, p = .44, adjusted a = .05 (Fig. 1). 
However, differences were observed between the Non-communicative/D-present and  Non-
communicative/D-not present conditions, U(1) = 39.0, p = .005, adjusted a = .021, as well as 
between the Communicative/D-not present and Non-communicative/D-not present conditions, 
U(1) = 16.0, p < .001, adjusted a = .007. These differences were driven by an increase in the 
emulative responses (more frequent selection of the baited container) in the Non-
communicative/D-not present condition compared with the other conditions. Specifically, the 
number of responses in the two ‘‘empty choice” response categories (i.e., imitation and 
pseudo-imitation) decreased in this condition. 
Causality checking behavior was relatively rare (33%) among those infants who performed 
pseudoimitative responses (binomial test, p = .50). However, 89% of infants who imitated 
some elements of the demonstrator’s action while manipulating the empty container 
performed causality checking behavior (binomial test, p < .001) (Table 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Number and percentage of infants exhibiting ‘‘emulative” (0), ‘‘pseudo-imitative” 
(1), and ‘‘imitative” (2) responses in each of four experimental conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 Number of infants who performed ‘‘causality checking” out of all infants in each 
experimental group. 
 
Experimental condition   Pseudo-imitation   Imitation 
Communicative/D-present   2/2 (100)    7/8 (88) 
Communicative/D-not present  0/2 (0)    9/11 (82) 
Non-communicative/D-present  1/4 (25)    6/6 (100) 
Non-communicative/D-not present  0/1 (0)    1/1 (100) 
Total      3/9 (33)    23/26 (89) 
 
Note. The two ‘‘empty choice” response categories (imitative and pseudo-imitative) are 
depicted. Percentages of infants who 
performed causality checking are in parentheses. 
 
Discussion 
 
Our purpose in the current study was to investigate the possible co-effect of a 
communicatively accentuated action demonstration and the presence or absence of the 
demonstrator during reenactment on the imitative behavior of infants. Previous studies 
showed effects of both social contextual factors (Király, 2009; Király et al., 2013; Nielsen & 
Blank, 2011). However, the possibility that these factors influence each other’s effect was not 
tested. The design of our task made it possible to differentiate between imitative and 
emulative responses because the less effective manipulation was spatially separated from the 
location of the goal object. 
During the demonstration phase the ball emerged from under the baited container due to the 
demonstrator’s manipulation of the empty one. Infants in this situation could follow one of 
three strategies: (a) goal-oriented emulation, that is, approaching the opaque baited container 
(a self-developed efficient solution); (b) pseudo-imitation, that is, approaching the empty 
container without repeating any action of the demonstrator; or (c) imitation, that is, 
approaching the empty container and reenacting one or more elements of the demonstrator’s 
actions. 
In addition, we tested infants’ understanding of the causality between the action manipulation 
and the outcome (i.e., causality checking; Carpenter et al., 1998). Our findings confirm that 
infants copy the observed action in order to reach the observed result, which is an assumption 
of insightful imitation. In fact, significantly fewer infants checked the baited container while 
manipulating the empty one in the pseudo-imitative response group (33%) than in the 
imitative response group (89%) (see Table S3 in supplementary material). Using this strategy-
based categorization, we compared the choice behavior of infants between the different 
conditions and found that the two social contextual factors interactively influence infants’ 
choice behavior. 
Due to the use of ostensive-communicative cues during the demonstration, the majority of 
infants performed imitative responses independently of the presence or absence of the 
demonstrator during reenactment (62% and 79%, respectively). This suggests that 
communicative cues have a stronger effect on infants’ choice behavior than the presence or 
absence of the demonstrator. The response was already formed during the demonstration 
phase and was not further modified during the test phase. This finding is in line with our 
hypothesis and further confirms the assumption that ostensive-communication has the 
potential to improve the encoding of the particular means that the demonstrator used to reach 
the goal (Gergely & Csibra, 2006; Király et al., 2013). Furthermore, such communication may 
also enhance infants’ tendency to repeat what they observed in order to achieve the goal in a 
‘‘socially prescribed” way while disregarding the efficiency of the solution. This 
interpretation could serve as a basis for social instrumental or normative learning (Csibra & 
Gergely, 2009; Kenward, 2012). 
In contrast, infants’ behavior in the non-communicative context was strongly affected by the 
presence of the demonstrator. This suggests that the non-communicative demonstration did 
not robustly evoke a particular learning mechanism and the final choice behavior was formed 
during the encoding phase. When the demonstrator was absent during the test phase, most 
infants (84%) produced an emulative response. In the absence of social influence, infants may 
have relied more heavily on their interpretation of the situation and developed a more efficient 
solution to reach the observed goal (goal emulation; see Brugger et al., 2007; Nielsen, 2006). 
The Non-communicative/D-present situation, however, appears to have failed to promote any 
one particular strategy. Visual inspection of the data indicates that infants performed more 
imitation in the Non-communicative/D-present situation relative to the D-not present 
condition. However, infants’ responses were relatively evenly distributed across the three 
response categories (imitative response: 44%; pseudo-imitative response: 28%; emulative 
response: 28%). Of note, it was in this condition that the greatest number of infants needed to 
be excluded due to non-responsiveness (5/10; see Table S1 in supplementary material). 
Visual inspection of the data further shows that infants imitated in the absence of the 
demonstrator only after a communicative context but not in the non-communicative context 
(79% vs. 8%). This further confirms the importance of the communicative demonstration in 
facilitating imitative tendencies (Király et al., 2013). Our results suggest that in a non-
communicative situation goal emulation becomes a dominant tendency only when infants are 
free from the demonstrator’s social influence during reenactment. 
In general, we found no difference between the Communicative/D-present and 
Noncommunicative/D-present conditions. However, the motivations underlying the apparent 
imitative behavior were likely different between the two conditions. In the communicative 
situation, communicative cues are presumably the main influencing factors and the presence 
of the demonstrator has no further effect on choice behavior. The presence of the 
demonstrator during reenactment after a non-communicative demonstration, however, diverts 
infants from their self-developed, more efficient (emulative) solution, presumably by offering 
alternative interpretations. Nevertheless, the role of the demonstrator as an influencing factor 
is unclear. Király (2009) suggested that the demonstrator during reenactment can act as a 
reminder cue in two ways through prompting different functions: by prompting an initiation 
of communication and by reminding the child of being engaged in a social context and, thus, 
inducing social pressure. In our Non-communicative/D-present situation, the infant could 
have tried to establish a communicative relationship with the demonstrator through an 
imitative act (Nielsen, 2006). Alternatively, the mere presence of the other partner exerted 
social pressure, which has been described as a strong motive for an individual to act like the 
other members of his or her group to ‘‘fit in” (Over and Carpenter, 2012). 
In conclusion, the current study provides the first evidence for the combined effect of 
ostensive communicative demonstration and the demonstrator’s presence during reenactment 
on 18-monthold infants’ choice behavior. Imitative responses may represent different motives 
in the different contexts; while ostensive communicative demonstration triggers learning 
about the observed action, the presence of the demonstrator in a non-communicative context 
is more likely to elicit a tendency to conform to the demonstrator’s behavior. The exact role 
that the demonstrator’s presence plays in the emergence of imitative, pseudo-imitative, or 
emulative responses is still unclear and, thus, is worthy of further investigation. 
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